

TRANSCRIPTION - ORIGINAL FOLLOWS

SENT TO: U.S. Mission GENEVA

TOSEC 36

NIACT

EYES ONLY FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE
ACTING SECRETARY

RE SECTO 25-762.00/7-2362

The following comments have been prepared by senior officers of the Department, including Bohlen:

In view of shortage of time and necessity of it reaching you before your next meeting with Gromyko, it has not REPEAT NOT had White House clearance, therefore represents only Departmental view.

Gromyko's comments in your two meetings do not add any factual material or any new arguments which would be of assistance in making a new evaluation of Soviet intentions. General tenor of the conversation seems to us to stick squarely on previous positions but is presented in a somewhat more definitive way in regard to the signature of a separate peace treaty. It is likewise noticed that Gromyko read from a paper which would indicate that he was operating under instructions from highest authority, but it is also noted that he

7-6-1960

147234

(4) DECLASSIFY

15

DEC-25: IMPART

1851

DELPHI

1 / Non-Competitive info

CLASSIFY
DOWNGRADE

PARTIAL TRANSCRIPTION - ORIGINAL FOLLOWS

tended to back away at end of first conversation on the threat aspect of his remarks. It is also significant that he put not time limit or date in regard to the signature of a peace treaty and was even more evasive when pressed as to exactly what would be its consequences other than implication of his remark that arrangements would have to be made with GDR and not with Soviet Union.

when satisfied that there is no give to use this as a justification for an eventual separate peace treaty.

Another conceivable but less likely motivation is that a strong negative Western attitude might be utilized by the Soviets as an argument against those elements within the communist bloc (in particular East

~~SECRET~~

~~Classification~~

related to past action of the Soviet Government at the threat aspect of his
position. He stated that he got no time limit or date in regard
to the signing of a peace treaty and was even more evasive when pressed
as to exactly what would be its consequences other than implication of his
remark that arrangements would have to be made with GDR and not with
Soviet Union.

Despite generally tougher line, it is no more possible now
than it was earlier to make any accurate prediction as to course of Soviet
future action and we are still inclined to believe that Soviets have not
definitely made up their mind on this aspect.

The threat of Soviet action and the constant repetition about
the necessity of removal of Western troops would seem to be in line with
recent indications from Moscow of Soviet position. It is possible that this
line is dictated by a desire to probe in depth the Western position and
when satisfied that there is no room to use this as a justification for an
attack on the West. It is also possible that this line is dictated by a desire to
press the West to accept a position of weakness and to accept a position of
weakness (Germans) or even within the Soviet Government who have been pressing for

~~SECRET~~

~~Classification~~

PARTIAL TRANSCRIPTION - ORIGINAL FOLLOWS

a radical solution of Berlin question. A strong Western attitude would demonstrate that any radical solution carries with it a great risk of war. We are unable to carry the analysis any farther.

It is of course conceivable that Gromyko may show some more flexibility in your next meeting with him, which we understand is at

~~SECRET~~

~~Classification~~

a radical solution of Berlin question. A strong Western attitude would demonstrate that any radical solution carries with it a great risk. We are unable to carry the analysis any farther.

It is of course conceivable that Gromyko may show some more flexibility in your next meeting with him, which we understand is at noon, Geneva time, tomorrow. We have noted that Gromyko has referred to the removal of Western forces as the "crucial point" of discussion. You might care at the next session if he sticks to this point to say that you had already given all the arguments as to why this was quite inconceivable for Western acceptance and in general shorten the conversation if there seems to be no Soviet give and tell Gromyko you would report his attitude to the President on your return and suggest that he should do the same with Khrushchev.

Ball

BALL

031507030

~~SECRET~~

~~Classification~~